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margin to external shocks. Intermediaries and direct exporters respond differently to exchange rate
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1 Introduction
The growing availability of ﬁrm-level international trade data has contributed to the blooming
of both theoretical and empirical literatures highlighting the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity
in aggregate trade ﬂows. Since the initial empirical papers of Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999),
Roberts and Tybout (1997) and the theoretical models of Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003),
a major focus in international trade has been on the relationship between the characteristics of pro-
ducing ﬁrms, most notably productivity, and their participation in international trade. An emerging
stream of research has examined diﬀerences among trading ﬁrms (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott;
2010b; Ahn et al.; 2011; Antr` as and Costinot; 2011). These papers emphasize that exporters in-
clude both manufacturing ﬁrms that organize the production and distribution of their goods abroad
as well as intermediaries that specialize in distribution in foreign markets.
In this paper, we examine the underlying factors that give rise to exports by intermediaries
and the consequences in terms of trade volumes and the margins of adjustment to external shocks.
Existing theoretical and empirical work on intermediaries in exporting emphasizes the importance
of country-speciﬁc ﬁxed export costs and the variation of intermediary export shares across desti-
nations. We extend that focus to include both broader country-level ﬁxed costs as well as charac-
teristics of the products themselves.
More importantly, this paper also considers additional implications of the lower ﬁxed costs for
wholesale exporters. If export intermediaries do indeed face lower ﬁxed costs of exporting then
they should also more easily enter and exit export markets in the face of changing proﬁtability.
Firm-level export volumes should respond diﬀerently for wholesale exporters and manufacturing
exporters. Aggregating to the country-level, this ﬁrm-level variation implies diﬀerential changes in
exports between destinations served primarily by direct and indirect exporters.
Using Italian ﬁrm-level trade data, we investigate the importance of intermediaries (wholesalers)
in exports across destinations and products and examine how they diﬀer from manufacturing ﬁrms
that export directly. More than one quarter of all exporters are intermediaries and they account
for over 10 percent of Italian exports. However, there is substantial variation in the importance of
intermediaries across countries and products. New Zealand and China have intermediary export
shares near 9 percent (25th percentile) while Paraguay and Malawi are at the 75th percentile with
shares above 23 percent.
Intermediary exporters diﬀer in a number of dimensions from manufacturing ﬁrms that export
directly. They are smaller in terms of exports, sales and especially employment as would be
expected since they are only involved in the cross-border distribution of the products and not the
production. However, wholesale exporters display higher sales per employee and comparable exports
per employee. On average, intermediary exporters reach fewer countries and ship more products
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than do direct exporters. One important diﬀerence between wholesalers and manufacturers lies in
their tendency to add and drop products. Intermediaries add and drop products at much higher
rates than direct exporters. These ﬁrms face lower sunk costs of exporting and thus are able to
adjust their extensive margin more easily.
The existence of intermediaries suggests that they overcome barriers to international trade at a
lower cost than manufacturers for some range of goods and for some countries. We examine the role
of both country and product characteristics in the choice of the mode of export and the magnitude
of country-product exports. The ﬁnding of previous studies that country-speciﬁc ﬁxed export costs
are correlated with the use of export intermediaries is conﬁrmed in the Italian data. In addition, the
quality of the general contracting environment is related to the choice of mode of export. Exports
through an intermediary are more likely when the quality of the general contracting environment
of the country is weak. Product characteristics also play a role in determining the choice of export
mode. Lower contract intensity, greater product homogeneity, and higher product-level sunk costs
of exporting are associated with a greater reliance on intermediaries in exporting.
The diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs across destinations and products give rise to variation in response
to common external shocks to proﬁtability such as exchange rates. Total exports by wholesalers
are less responsive to exchange rate changes precisely because wholesalers are better able to adjust
along the extensive margin. Given the big diﬀerence in the share of intermediated exports across
countries and products, these ﬁrm-level results suggest that there are potentially large, predictable
diﬀerences in how aggregate exports will respond to changes in the value of the domestic currency.
We indeed ﬁnd that the responsiveness of aggregate exports is much greater in destinations served
primarily by direct exporters.
Existing theoretical and empirical work on exporting intermediaries is reviewed in Section 2.
Section 3 describes the ﬁrm and country level data. Section 4 documents diﬀerences between direct
exporters and wholesalers. The role of country and product ﬁxed costs on the choice of export
mode and export values are examined in Section 5. Section 6 explores the response of exports both
at the ﬁrm level and in the aggregate to exchange rates shocks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical frameworks
Recent models of international trade emphasize the role that heterogeneity in productivity plays in
explaining the structure of international commerce. According to these models and a large quan-
tity of associated empirical work, more productive ﬁrms are more likely to engage in exporting and
foreign direct investment. While these frameworks have been extended to examine multiple desti-
nations and multiple products, they generally assume that trade occurs directly between producers
in one country and ﬁnal consumers in another and do not account for the activity of intermediary
ﬁrms in trade.
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Early theoretical work on the role of intermediaries in international trade, e.g Rauch and Watson
(2004) and more recently Petropoulou (2007), models international trade as an outcome of search
and networks. Several new papers in the theoretical literature on intermediaries in exporting have
taken a more technological perspective based on models of heterogeneous ﬁrms (Ahn et al.; 2011;
Akerman; 2010; Felbermayr and Jung; 2011).
New models of trade, in particular Akerman (2010) and Ahn et al. (2011), extend the heteroge-
neous ﬁrm trade model of Melitz (2003) by introducing an intermediation technology which allows
wholesalers to exploit economies of scope in exporting. While all active ﬁrms serve the domestic
market, manufacturers have a choice of how to potentially serve a foreign market. Domestic man-
ufacturing ﬁrms are allowed to choose between direct exports to a consumer in the foreign market
and the use of an intermediary ﬁrm who controls the goods as they cross the international border.1
While the details of the models vary, the general framework is similar. Exporting directly incurs
a ﬁxed cost and a variable cost. Indirect exporting takes place through an intermediary ﬁrm, or
using intermediary ‘technology’. The intermediary is assumed to be able to lower the ﬁxed costs of
exporting while possibly incurring additional variable costs. This choice means that a number of
manufacturing ﬁrms may export indirectly through a wholesaler, rather than managing their own
distribution networks. These ﬁrms pay an intermediary ﬁxed cost which is smaller than their own
ﬁxed cost of direct export. In this more realistic setting, ﬁrms choose to serve the foreign market
either directly or through domestically-based export intermediaries.
Firms sort according to productivity into diﬀerent export channels. As in the standard model of
Melitz (2003), the least productive ﬁrms serve only the domestic market while the most productive
ﬁrms can export directly by incurring the ﬁxed cost of export and any variable trade costs. A
third category of ﬁrms chooses to export indirectly through wholesalers. This third group, which
looks like non-exporters in the data, includes some ﬁrms who would not have been exporters in
the absence of intermediaries and some ﬁrms who would be marginal exporters in the absence of
intermediaries.
Analogous to Helpman et al. (2004), we can compare graphically the proﬁts generated by each
type of activity for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity.2 The two solid lines in Figure 1 depict proﬁts
from the domestic market (πd) and additional proﬁts for ﬁrms that export directly (πxd). The
proﬁt functions are increasing in productivity (α) as more productive ﬁrms are able to charge a
1Blum et al. (2011) and Blum et al. (2010) look the role of intermediaries largely from the perspective of the
importing country while Rauch and Watson (2004) discuss when intermediary ﬁrms actually take possession of the
goods.
2In this example we assume that the ﬁrm itself has access to the intermediation technology. Akerman (2010)
models intermediaries explicitly in a monopolistic competition setting. Intermediaries face ﬁxed costs of exporting
that are increasing in the number of varieties handled by the exporter and their variable costs per variety include
tariﬀs and the domestic price of the variety. Producing ﬁrms view intermediaries as identical to any other domestic
consumer and thus only face domestic ﬁxed costs of production. The resulting pictures and cutoﬀs are similar
although his framework allows for a richer set of predictions on the size and scope of intermediaries.












Figure 1: Proﬁts from domestic sales, indirect and direct exports
lower price, capture a large market share and generate larger proﬁts. The intercept of the domestic
curve is smaller in absolute value than that of exports because the ﬁxed costs that are incurred for
selling on the domestic market (fd) are lower than what a ﬁrm must pay to export directly abroad
(fx). Moreover, since there is a per unit variable cost of export, the slope of the proﬁt function
for direct exports is ﬂatter than the slope of the proﬁt function for domestic production. These
relationships introduce two productivity cut-oﬀs (αd and αx), that in turn indicate which ranges
of productivity determine exit, domestic sales only, or direct exports.
With the possibility of exporting through intermediaries, ﬁrms now have also an additional
option of using the intermediation ‘technology’ to export. By assumption the ﬁxed costs in the
intermediation technology are lower than the ﬁxed costs of direct exporting and are greater than or
equal to the ﬁxed costs of domestic sales; fi is between fd and fx in Figure 1. The degree to which
the intermediation ﬁxed costs are lower than those of direct exporting depends on the combination
of country, industry and country-variety ﬁxed costs of selling in the foreign market as discussed
further below.
The dotted curve drawn in Figure 1 depicts proﬁts for ﬁrms that export indirectly (πi) through
an intermediary. If using an intermediary does not raise the variable costs of exporting then all
manufacturers would employ the intermediation technology and export indirectly, πi (α) > πd (α)
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∀α. To allow for both direct and indirect exporting, the intermediary exporter faces additional
variable costs. In Akerman (2010), the intermediary sets the export price of each variety as a
standard mark-up over its own marginal cost, where its marginal cost includes both variable trade
costs and the domestic purchase price of the variety, which is itself a mark-up over the variable
cost of production. In Ahn et al. (2011), it is assumed that intermediaries face no ﬁxed costs of
exporting but charge a variable cost to transport the goods.
The combination of lower ﬁxed costs and higher variable costs at intermediaries introduces a
third productivity cut-oﬀ, αi, which is the zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ for exporting through an intermediary.3
If αd < αi < αx then there will be an equilibrium with ‘pure’ domestic producers and both direct
and indirect exporting. Firms with productivity levels below αd earn negative proﬁts and exit the
industry. Firms with productivity levels between αd and αi, produce only for the domestic market.
Firms with productivity between αi and αxd now can proﬁtably access the foreign market through
wholesalers. Finally, ﬁrms with productivity levels above αxd produce for the domestic market
and export directly. Note that the group of ﬁrms with indirect exports includes some ﬁrms with
productivity too low to ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export directly, αi ≤ α < αx and some ﬁrms of higher
productivity that prefer indirect to direct exporting, αx ≤ α < αxd.
A ﬁrm’s decision regarding the mode of export is determined by variable and ﬁxed trade costs,
which in turn also depends on country and product characteristics. The degree to which ﬁxed costs
are reduced using intermediaries depends on the nature of the ﬁxed cost, e.g. the combination of
country, industry and country-variety components. We can write the ﬁxed costs of direct exporting
of variety k in industry j to country c as
fx = fc + fj + fkc
where fc is a ﬁxed export cost common to all varieties exported to country c, fj is a ﬁxed export
cost common to all varieties in industry j regardless of the number of destinations, and fkc is a ﬁxed
export cost speciﬁc to the variety and country. The greater the share of idiosyncratic ﬁxed costs,
fkc, in total ﬁxed costs, fx, the lower the possibility for economies of scope and the lower the share
of exports handled by intermediaries. Both country and industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs allow for the
possibility of indirect exporting. Exporting intermediaries may arise because they are able to share
the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost of exporting across many industries and varieties and/or they may
exist because they are able to spread industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs across varieties and destinations.
Existing theoretical frameworks typically ignore the possibility of industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs but it
remains an empirical question as to whether intermediaries are country- or industry-speciﬁc relative
to direct exporters.
3It is possible that no producer will choose to export through an intermediary if the increase in variable cost is
suﬃciently large.
5Intermediaries in International Trade
The simple framework provides some clear predictions for the variation of direct and indirect
trade across countries. To the extent that intermediaries solve only the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs
of exporting, e.g. each variety exported faces indirect ﬁxed costs fi = fc/n + fkc, where n is the
number of varieties handled by the intermediary, the diﬀerence between direct and indirect ﬁxed
costs will be increasing as country ﬁxed costs rise.
The role of variable trade costs is less clear-cut in these models. A rise in variable trade costs that
aﬀects both direct and intermediary exporters, such as tariﬀs or transportation costs, can increase,
decrease or leave unchanged the share of exports handled by intermediaries. In the empirical work
we examine the role of variable trade costs including distance and tariﬀs in determining the share
of exports handled by intermediaries.
The existing theoretical frameworks emphasize the interaction of producer ﬁrm heterogene-
ity and ﬁxed export costs in the decision to export directly or indirectly. While these models
are all static models of single-product ﬁrms, it is relatively easy to envision a dynamic exten-
sion where ﬁrms potentially make multiple products and their proﬁtability evolves over time (see
Bernard, Redding and Schott; 2010; Bernard et al.; 2011). In a dynamic environment, variation in
the sunk cost of exporting across ﬁrm types would lead to predictable variation in product adding
and product dropping in the export market. Firms facing lower sunk costs would be more likely
to both add and drop products in steady state and in the face of exogenous shocks to proﬁtability.
As intermediary exporters have lower entry costs they should be more likely to churn their export
product mix.
2.1 Related empirical literature
Recent papers by Ahn et al. (2011), Akerman (2010) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott
(2010b) examine various aspects of intermediaries in exports for China, Sweden and the US, re-
spectively. None of the papers uses exactly the same deﬁnition of an exporting intermediary so the
results are not directly comparable to each other or those presented below.4
Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010b) document the role of intermediaries in US ex-
ports. They ﬁnd that 35 percent of US exporters are wholesalers accounting for 10 percent of
US exports by value. Their work emphasizes the diﬀerences in the attributes between exporters
of diﬀerent types. Among exporting ﬁrms, pure wholesalers are much smaller than ‘producer-
consumer’ ﬁrms in terms of employment, but only slightly smaller in terms of exports per worker
4Speciﬁcally, Ahn et al. (2011) deﬁne an intermediary as a ﬁrm with certain Chinese characters in its
name, Akerman (2010) uses the main activity of the ﬁrm and includes both wholesalers and retailers and
Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010b) distinguish between pure wholesalers, pure retailers and two types
of ﬁrms that mix manufacturing with wholesaling and retailing. As discussed below we only consider ﬁrms with
wholesaling as their main activity as intermediaries.
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and domestic sales per worker.5 Other diﬀerences include the types of products exported and the
destinations served, wholesalers are more likely to export food-related sectors and export to lower
income countries.
Akerman (2010) reports slightly more exporting intermediaries than manufacturers and signif-
icant diﬀerences between the two types of exporters. Intermediaries are smaller in terms of total
turnover, much smaller in terms of export value, but export more products and ship to more desti-
nations. Akerman (2010) regresses country-sector intermediary export shares on gravity variables
and proxies for country ﬁxed export costs. Intermediary export shares increase in distance and
measures of ﬁxed costs and fall with destination GDP.
In contrast with the other studies, Ahn et al. (2011) ﬁnd much higher exports per ﬁrm and
unit values for intermediaries than for direct exporters. Intermediaries are also active in many
more products than direct exporters. Regressions of product-country intermediary export shares
on country characteristics show positive relationships for distance, tariﬀs and a measure of ﬁxed
costs and a negative relationship with destination GDP.
This paper builds on this growing empirical literature and extends it in a number of directions.
First, it documents the diﬀerences between producing exporters and intermediary exporters in
terms of their ﬁrm characteristics, destination and product mixes, product churning and export
values and quantities. We then examine export participation and levels by direct and intermediary
exporters across countries and products and their relation to country and product characteristics.
Finally the underlying sources of intermediated trade are shown to cause intermediaries to diﬀer
in terms of their responses to aggregate shocks, both in terms of export value and the margins of
adjustment.
3 Data
3.1 Trade and Firm data
The analysis of direct versus indirect modes of export is based upon two ﬁrm-level datasets collected
by the Italian statistical oﬃce (ISTAT), namely Statistiche del Commercio Estero (COE) and
Archivio Statistico Imprese Attive (ASIA).6
The COE dataset consists of all cross-border transactions performed by Italian ﬁrms and it
covers the period 2000-2007. COE includes the annual value and quantity of export transactions
by the ﬁrm for product-country destination pairs.7 A product is deﬁned as a six digit category in
5‘Producer-consumer’ ﬁrms in Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010b) include any ﬁrm with no reported
employment in wholesaling or retailing and thus include both manufacturers and other service ﬁrms.
6The database has been made available for work after careful screening to avoid disclosure of individual information.
The data were accessed at the ISTAT facilities in Rome.
7ISTAT, collects data on exports based on transactions. The European Union sets a common framework of rules
but leaves some ﬂexibility to member states. A detailed description of requirements for data collection on exports in
Italy is provided in the Appendix.
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the Harmonized System (HS6).
Using the unique identiﬁcation code of the ﬁrm, we link the ﬁrm-level export data to ISTAT’s
archive of active ﬁrms, ASIA. In ASIA, ﬁrms are classiﬁed according to their main activity, as iden-
tiﬁed by ISTAT’s standard codes for sectoral classiﬁcation of business (5-digit ATECO). This infor-
mation allows us to distinguish between four broad categories of ﬁrms: manufacturers, wholesalers,
retailers, and a residual group including the remaining sectors.8 ASIA also contains information on
ﬁrms’ operations including the number of employees and total turnover.9 The combined dataset
used for the analysis is not a sample but rather includes all active ﬁrms.
3.2 Country level data
Firm-level trade data are complemented by country characteristics including proxies for market size
and variable and ﬁxed trade costs.10 For market size we use total GDP from the World Bank World
Development Indicators database. Variable trade costs may be either due to policy barriers, such as
tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers, or to the cost of moving goods across borders, such as transportation
costs. Following the large gravity literature, transportation costs are proxied by geographic distance
calculated using the great circle formula (Mayer and Zignago; 2005).
As emphasized in the literature on ﬁrms and exporting (Roberts and Tybout; 1997; Melitz;
2003; Bernard and Jensen; 2004; Bernard et al.; 2007; Eaton et al.; 2011), ﬁrms incur ﬁxed entry
costs in order to enter foreign markets. These ﬁxed costs can be related to the establishment of a
foreign distribution network, diﬃculties in enforcing contractual agreements, or the uncertainty of
dealing with foreign bureaucracies. We create two measures of country-level ﬁxed costs. To generate
a proxy for the market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting to a country, we use information from three
measures from the World Bank Doing Business dataset: number of documents for importing, cost
of importing and time to import (Djankov et al.; 2011). Given the high level of correlation between
these variables, we use the primary factor (Market Costs) derived from principal component analysis
as that factor accounts for most of the variance contained in the original indicators (see Table A1
in Appendix).
Data on the contracting environment are available from a variety of sources, e.g. World Bank,
Heritage Foundation, and Transparency International. To proxy for institutional quality we use
information from the six variables in the World Bank’s Governance dataset (Kaufman et al.; 2009):
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Ef-
fectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. As these six measures are
highly correlated, we follow Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010a) and use the primary fac-
8In particular, we classify ﬁrms in sectors from 151 to 372 as manufacturers, and ﬁrms in sectors from 501 to 519
(with the exclusion of 502 which concerns the activity of repair of motor vehicles) as wholesalers. Retailers are ﬁrms
in sectors 521 to 527, and Others contains the remaining sectors.
9Information on total turnover are available only for two years, 2000 & 2003.
10More details on the country-level variables are available in the Appendix.
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tor obtained from principal component analysis, Governance, as the proxy for country governance
quality.11 If ﬁrms must invest in ﬁxed resources to export to countries with weaker contracting
environments, one would expect better Governance to be associated with lower intermediary export
shares.
Finally, in order to account for the eﬀect of policy barriers on the presence of intermediaries and
manufacturers we also consider HS6 product-country import tariﬀs, taken from World Integrated
Trade System (WITS).12
3.3 Product level data
The paper also investigates a set of product and industry variables that aﬀect the probability that
a producer exports directly rather than through an intermediary. Goods with high destination-
speciﬁc costs of entering a foreign market, or ﬁnding a foreign customer, are more likely to be
exported directly. Similarly industries with higher entry costs are less likely to be served by direct
exports.
We consider both product characteristics that are related to the speciﬁcity of the product
and those more generally related to market structure. A measure of industry contract intensity
developed by Nunn (2007) is used to measure the importance of relationship-speciﬁc investment in
intermediate inputs across industries. Nunn’s original data, corresponding to US I-O industries,
is concorded to HS6 products.13 Industries that require more relationship-speciﬁc investments are
expected to be less easily served by intermediaries as the product-market component of ﬁxed costs
is relatively large.
In order to account for diﬀerentiation within a HS6 product class we employ the coeﬃcient
of price dispersion.14 Lower price dispersion is assumed to be associated with more homogeneous
products. For homogeneous products, the product-market component of ﬁxed costs will be lower
and thus it is more likely that the export transactions will be carried out by an intermediary.
We adapt a measure of product-level sunk entry costs developed by Bernard and Jensen (2007)
to the export market. In steady state, a product with high sunk costs of entry into export markets
should have a low entry rate and a low (and equal) exit rate. During transitions between steady
states, either the entry rate (expanding product) or the exit rate (shrinking product) may be
11Table A2 in Appendix reports the results of the principal component analysis for the governance measure.
12WITS contains the TRAINS database on bilateral tariﬀs at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS)
product classiﬁcation for about 5,000 products and 200 countries. TRAINS provides information on four diﬀerent
type of tariﬀs: Most-Favored National Tariﬀs (MFN), Preferential Tariﬀs (PRF), Bound Tariﬀs (BND), and the
eﬀectively applied tariﬀs (AHS). We use the AHS tariﬀ in the empirical analysis. The AHS tariﬀ is the MFN Applied
tariﬀ, unless a preferential tariﬀ exists.
13See the Data Appendix for a description of the concordance procedure.
14The coeﬃcient of price variation is computed on COE data as the coeﬃcient of variation in the unit values of any
of the HS6 products across all ﬁrm-product-country transactions. In the empirical analysis we use data from 2003,
but the product ranking in terms of price dispersion does not vary much over the years.
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unusually high. However, the minimum of the two rates should still correspond to steady-state
entry or exit. We calculate the minimum of the ﬁrm-level export entry and exit rates for each
product, min(entry, exit).15 A higher level of entry and exit indicates lower sunk costs of exporting
and a lower likelihood that the product will be exported through an intermediary.
4 Manufacturers and Intermediaries
The focus of the present work is to investigate the role of intermediaries in exports. This section
documents the extent of intermediation in Italian exports, highlighting important stylized facts
about intermediaries and showing how they diﬀer from manufacturing ﬁrms. Table 1 reports the
total value of exports and the relative share of four broad categories of ﬁrms: manufacturers,
wholesalers, retailers, and a residual group including ﬁrms in all the remaining sectors.
A preponderance of exports, more than 84 percent of the value, is performed directly by man-
ufacturing ﬁrms. Manufacturing exporters also represent more than 50 percent of exporting ﬁrms.
However, an increasing share of exports is conducted by the 27 percent of exporters that are whole-
salers, rising from 9.9 percent in 2000 to 11.3 percent of Italian exports in 2007. These ﬁgures
are in line with those reported for the US in Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010b) where
wholesalers are 35 percent of exporting ﬁrms and control just over 10 percent of US exports. As
in other countries, retailers are relatively minor players in exporting, accounting for less than one
percent of exports by value. As a result the paper focuses on the role of wholesalers as export
intermediaries and uses the two terms interchangeably.
While intermediaries account for just 11 percent of Italian exports, there is substantial variation
across both countries and products, see Table 2. At the country level, intermediary export shares
range from a low of zero to a high of 88 percent. At the bottom of the interquartile range are
countries such as Belgium, Norway, France, New Zealand and China with intermediary export
shares close to 9 percent; at the top of the interquartile range, we ﬁnd Paraguay, Moldova, Malawi
and Albania with wholesale export shares near 23 percent. While the overall share of intermediary
exports is just under 11 percent in 2003, across destinations, unweighted intermediary export shares
average 16.6 percent and are higher on average for non-EU countries. This indicates that wholesalers
are relatively more important in smaller markets and in markets outside the EU.
The share of intermediaries across products also displays substantial variation, see the second
panel of Table 2. Wholesalers account for 21 percent of the exports for the average product, pointing
to the importance of intermediaries in products with lower total export values. While there exist
15The entry rate is the number of new exporters of the product between year t and t+s divided by the average
number of exporters in the two years. The exit rate is the number of ﬁrms that stop exporting the product between
t and t+s divided by the average number of exporters in the two years. The min(entry, exit) in a given product is
computed on COE data for years 2003 and 2007. Considering diﬀerent years for the computation of the rates does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results.
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both products which are sold abroad only through intermediaries, 1.8 percent of 5,125 products,
and others where the share of wholesalers is zero, most products are exported both directly and
indirectly.
Specialization is more common at the product-country level. Of the 244,614 product-country
combinations with positive exports, 48.6 percent involve direct exports only and 10.4 percent are
served exclusively by intermediaries.16
4.1 Firm characteristics
In their work on US traders, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010b) ﬁnd not only that
traders diﬀer from domestic ﬁrms, but also that substantial heterogeneity exists between trad-
ing ﬁrms of diﬀerent ‘types’. The results here complement and extend that analysis by comparing
manufacturers and wholesalers along a number of dimensions including size, the number of desti-
nation countries and the number of products exported.
The top left panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of employment for all wholesale and
manufacturing ﬁrms. The employment distribution for wholesalers lies far to the left of that for
manufacturers. Overall, intermediaries are much smaller in terms of number of employees. However,
when we proxy size with total sales (top right panel) the diﬀerence between the two distributions
remains but is greatly reduced. The diﬀerences between the panels implies that the sales per
employee ratio of wholesalers is much higher than that of manufacturers.17 The bottom panels
of Figure 2 show the size distributions for wholesale and manufacturing exporters. The relative
ranking of the two distributions is similar to that seen above.
The ﬁgures are consistent with the idea that manufacturing ﬁrms are performing two activi-
ties, the physical production of the goods and the intermediation of the goods to a downstream
customer, while wholesalers are only engaged in the latter activity. This distinction is important
when attempting to compare the exporting activities of wholesalers and manufacturers as the use
of employment as a proxy for ﬁrm size may yield misleading comparisons. A manufacturing ﬁrm
with 100 employees will typically have lower sales and exports than a wholesale ﬁrm with the same
employment. As a consequence, we use both employment and total sales as proxies for size in the
analysis.
Figure 3 displays the binned relation between log exports and log employment, reporting the
(log) number of employees a ﬁrm needs, on average, for a certain level of exports.18 The plot
16For product-country pairs with a mix of direct and indirect exports the average indirect share is 25.3 percent.
17We caution that sales per employee is not a good measure of ﬁrm productivity when comparing ﬁrms of diﬀerent
types.
18Binned plots allow for a succinct representation of the relation between two variables and avoid displaying clouds
of thousands of observations. Here data are placed in 20 equally-sized bins according to their (log of) export value,
and the x-coordinate displays the average of the bin. The y-coordinate is the average (log of) employment within
that bin.




















































































































Size Distribution for Exporting firms
Figure 2: Empirical density of ﬁrm size in 2003 - All ﬁrms (Top) and Exporters (Bottom). Size is
proxied by (log of) employment (Left) and (log of) sales (Right). Densities estimates are obtained
using the Epanenchnikov kernel with the bandwidth set using the optimal routine described in
Silverman (1986).
conﬁrms that wholesalers require fewer employees to attain any given level of export value.
To quantify the diﬀerences between manufacturers and wholesalers, we estimate the following
cross-sectional OLS regression,




f ) + εf (1)
where lnYf denotes the logarithm of either total sales, number of employees, or sales per employee
ratio. DW
f is a ﬁrm-level dummy variable, one for wholesaler and zero for manufacturer; DX
f is
a dummy indicating if a ﬁrm is an exporter; and (DW
f ∗ DX
f ) is the interaction between the two
dummies and takes value of one if a ﬁrm is a wholesaler exporter and zero otherwise. The results
are presented in Table 3.
As expected, manufacturers are on average larger than wholesalers, 0.111 log points (12 per-
cent) in terms of sales and 0.533 log points (70 percent) in terms of employment, δ is negative and


























Employment per level of exports
Manufacturers
Wholesalers
Figure 3: Relation between (log of) employment and exports, 2003. Observations are placed in 20
equally-sized bins according to the variable on x-axis. Coordinates of dots display the average of x
and y variables of the data in each bin (see text).
signiﬁcant in both speciﬁcations. In contrast, sales per employee are substantially higher at whole-
salers. We also conﬁrm the now-standard results that manufacturing exporters are dramatically
larger and have higher sales per employee than their domestic counterparts, β is large, positive and
signiﬁcant.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we provide the ﬁrst evidence that the selection of ﬁrms into exporting
may be working for wholesalers as well. Exporting wholesale ﬁrms have total sales 14.8 times
larger than non-exporting wholesalers and employ 2.8 times as many workers, β +γ is positive and
signiﬁcant. Sales per employee at exporting intermediaries are 5 times higher than at non-exporters.
Looking at exports in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3, we ﬁnd that the value of exports at wholesalers
is also much smaller than that of manufacturing exporters but that this diﬀerence largely disappears
when considering exports per employee.
The regression results of Table 3 conﬁrm the conclusions from the relative distributional plots in
Figure 2. In particular, the evidence on higher sales per employee, especially at exporters, supports
the idea that wholesalers focus on just the intermediation portion of the activities carried out by
manufacturers.
4.2 Product and Geographic Diversity
The theoretical models discussed in Section 2 generally focus on the role of intermediaries in solv-
ing the ﬁxed cost problem for speciﬁc markets. This section provides evidence on the presence
of intermediaries in markets and sectors. Figure 4 displays the relation between geographic and
product diversiﬁcation of the ﬁrm and its size, distinguishing between wholesalers and manufactur-
ers. Geographic diversiﬁcation is proxied by the number of destination countries (Countriesf) and
product diversiﬁcation by the number of products exported (Productsf); size is represented both































































































































Number of Products and Exports
Manufacturers
Wholesalers
Figure 4: Top Number of countries and (left) employment and (right) exports, in 2003. Bottom
Number of products and (left) employment and (right) exports, in 2003. Observations are placed
in 20 equally-sized bins according to the variable on x-axis. Coordinates of dots display the average
of x and y variables of the data in each bin (see text).
by employment and export value.
The evidence in Figure 4 suggests that the wholesalers’ technology does not convey them an
advantage in terms of geographic diversiﬁcation, wholesalers export to fewer countries than do
manufacturers at similar levels of employment and exports.19 On the contrary, when considering
the relation between ﬁrm size and product diversiﬁcation (bottom panel), we ﬁnd that, at every
size class, wholesalers export more products than manufacturers.
Table 4 reports the results of the regression of the number of products exported and the number
of destination markets (Products and Countries, respectively) on the ﬁrm wholesaler dummy, DW
f ,
and a proxy for ﬁrm size,
Yf = c + δDW
f + lnSizef + εf if DX
f = 1. (2)
19Ahn et al. (2011) report that Chinese intermediaries export more products and export to more countries than
direct exporters. However, as noted previously, Chinese intermediary export ﬁrms are almost twice as big as direct
exporters in terms of total export value.
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The ﬁrst row of Column 1 shows that, unconditionally, wholesale exporters export fewer HS6
products. However, including a control for ﬁrm size, either log employment or log export value, the
coeﬃcient becomes positive and signiﬁcant; exporting intermediaries are active in a wider range of
products compared to similarly-sized manufacturers. In contrast, intermediaries serve fewer export
markets even when adjusting for ﬁrm size. These results suggest that intermediaries are indeed
able to spread country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs over a wider range of products.
4.3 Within Product-Country
The availability of product level data allows the comparison of wholesalers and manufacturing
exporters within product-country destinations.20 Using exports to Extra-EU destinations for 2003
and considering product-country pairs where both wholesalers and manufacturers are active, we
estimate the following speciﬁcation,
lnYfcp = c + δDW
f + β lnSales + dpc + εfcp (3)
where lnYfcp denotes the logarithm of, respectively, the total value, quantity and unit value of
the ﬁrm’s exports in the country-product pair, DW
f is the ﬁrm wholesaler dummy and dpc denotes
country-product ﬁxed eﬀects. The results in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 show that wholesalers
have a substantially lower total value of exports relative to direct exporters within product-country
pairs. The diﬀerence in exports across ﬁrm types remains even after controlling for ﬁrm size,
although the magnitude is reduced. Columns 3-6 report similar regressions for export quantities
and unit values. The lower exports for wholesalers are driven entirely by lower export quantities;
unit values are not statistically diﬀerent for direct and intermediary exporters.
4.4 Product Adding and Dropping
The cross-sectional analysis reveals that exporting wholesalers are smaller than manufacturers and
that they export a larger number of products to a smaller set of destinations. In addition to lower
ﬁrm-level trade ﬂows, intermediaries also ship less within a product-country pair. These results
are broadly supportive of a framework emphasizing country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting. As
discussed earlier, the presence of sunk export costs that vary across ﬁrm types also has implications
for export dynamics. Lower sunk costs should result in higher probabilities of both entry into
exporting and exit from exporting. A dynamic extension of the framework presented earlier would
suggest that intermediaries should be more likely to add and drop products from their export
portfolio than direct exporters. This is conﬁrmed by the unconditional drop rates across ﬁrms
20We focus all the remaining empirical work on exports to Extra-EU destinations for several reasons. Most im-
portantly, ﬁrm-level exports to the EU are not recorded for all exporters and these criteria have changed over time.
Also, real exchange rate changes within the eurozone countries are driven entirely by changes in relative price levels.
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types: on average the fraction of exported ﬁrm-products outside the EU that is dropped every year
is 50% among all ﬁrms, 48% for manufacturers and 53% for wholesalers.
Following Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010), we analyze export product switching between
t and t+1 using those years for which we have information on ﬁrms’ total turnover, 2000-2001 and
2003-2004. We estimate a linear probability model of product dropping for ﬁrms that export in
year t and t + 1 of the form,
Dropfpt = c + δDW
ft + β1 lnSalesft + β2Deviationfpt + β3 lnProductsft + dp + dt + εfpt (4)
where Dropfpt takes value 1 if the product is exported by the ﬁrm f in year t and not exported in
year t+1 and equal zero if the product is exported in both years. DW
ft is the ﬁrm wholesale dummy
and is the variable of interest. To control for ﬁrm attributes associated with product switching, we
include ﬁrm size, lnSalesft, the relative importance of the ﬁrm in the exports of the product given
by the log diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s exports in product p and average ﬁrm exports in product p,
Deviationfpt, and the number of products exported by the ﬁrm in year t,lnProductsft. Product
and year ﬁxed eﬀects, dp and dt respectively, are also included.
Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of the ﬁrm-product dropping speciﬁcation equa-
tion 4 for Extra-EU countries. Wholesaler exporters are much more likely to drop a product than
manufacturer exporters, 6.9 percentage points or 14.4 percent. This diﬀerential persists even con-
trolling for ﬁrm size, the number of exported products and the relative importance of the ﬁrm in
the product, although the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is reduced.
If wholesalers have lower sunk costs per product, then they should also be more likely to add
products.21 We examine the probability that a current exporter adds a product to its export
portfolio between years t and t + 1 in the speciﬁcation,
Addft = c + δDW
ft + β1 lnSalesft + β2 lnProductsft + dind + dt + εft (5)
where Addft takes value 1 if the ﬁrm adds an export product and zero otherwise. DW
ft, lnSalesft,
and lnProductsft are deﬁned as above. Additional controls include year ﬁxed eﬀects, dt, and
industry-mix ﬁxed eﬀects, dind that controls for ﬁrms with the same mix of industries at the HS2
level.22
Results of Table 7 show that intermediaries are more likely to add a product than manufacturers.
This ﬁnding is robust to controlling for ﬁrm size and number of exported products, and the eﬀect
is more pronounced when comparing wholesalers and manufacturers among single product ﬁrms.
21On average the fraction of ﬁrms that add at least one export product outside the EU every year is 79%: 79% for
manufacturers and 80% for wholesalers. Among single product (multiple products) ﬁrms the ratio is 65% (83%) for
all ﬁrms, 62% (83%) for manufacturers and 69% (83%) for wholesalers. On average the fraction of ﬁrms that drop
at least one export product outside the EU every year is 80%: 80% for manufacturers and 79% for wholesalers.
22While the dropping regression was estimated at the ﬁrm-product level, the adding speciﬁcation is at the ﬁrm-level.
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Figure 5: Wholesale export share and gravity variables, 2003. Figures report the relationship be-
tween wholesale export share and gravity variables: (Left) Real GDP; (Right) Geographic distance.
Each panel reports the coeﬃcient, b, of a country-level univariate regression for intermediary export
share. Robust standard error is shown in parenthesis.
The results on both export product dropping and export product adding suggest that interme-
diary exporters face lower sunk costs of participation in the export market. These ﬁndings suggest
that shocks such as changes in tariﬀs or exchange rates may have diﬀerential eﬀects on wholesalers
and manufacturers even within the same country-product pair. We return to examine the eﬀects
of exchange rate changes across ﬁrm types in the ﬁnal section of the paper.
5 Exports by Intermediaries
The previous sections have shown that exporting wholesalers diﬀer from manufacturing exporters
in terms of size, geographic coverage, product portfolio and entry and exit. This section focuses on
diﬀerences in the role of wholesalers across countries and products.
5.1 Intermediary Export Share
We start by exploring the relationship between the intermediary export share by destination market
and a set of relevant country variables (Figures 5-6). The correlation of intermediary export shares
by country with market size and distance is displayed in the two panels of Figure 5. Wholesale
export share is declining in log GDP, smaller markets have greater intermediary export shares,
consistent with the idea that in smaller destination markets, ﬁxed entry costs have to be spread
over fewer units. In contrast, there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between distance, a
common proxy for variable trade costs, and the intermediary export share.
Country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of trade are generally expected to be positively related to inter-
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Figure 6: Wholesale export share and country-level ﬁxed costs, 2003. Figures report the relationship
between wholesale export share and the two proxies for ﬁxed market entry costs: (Left) Market Size;
(Right) Governance indicator. Each panel reports the coeﬃcient, b, of a country-level univariate
regression for intermediary export share. Robust standard error is shown in parenthesis.
mediary trade shares.23 The plot at the left of Figure 6 displays the relationship between the
percentage of export value that goes through intermediaries and the Market Costs variable. As
found by Ahn et al. (2011) and Akerman (2010), this measure of market access costs is positively
and signiﬁcantly related to intermediary trade shares.
The right panel of Figure 6 plots the intermediaries export share against country Governance.
As expected, the quality of country governance is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to intermedi-
aries export share. This evidence supports the idea that as country-level ﬁxed costs increase, more
ﬁrms use wholesalers for exporting.
Finally, we investigate the link between the HS6 product characteristics and intermediary export
shares. While the theoretical models remain largely silent on this aspect, product characteristics
would be expected to play a role in explaining the type of ﬁrm handling the exports.24 If goods with
higher relation-speciﬁcity have relatively larger product-country ﬁxed costs of exporting, the share
of direct exports is likely to be greater. Transactions involving complex goods, whose production
process is intensive in the use of highly specialized and customized inputs, may require speciﬁc
knowledge and tasks because of the eﬀort associated with the identiﬁcation of potential customers,
more detailed contracts, post-sale service, etc. For those goods, the product-market component of
ﬁxed costs is relatively large and such goods are more likely to be exported directly by manufacturing
23Higher country-level ﬁxed costs of exporting and weaker governance are associated with smaller total levels of
exports (Lawless; 2010; Djankov et al.; 2011), here we consider their relationship to the composition of exports by
ﬁrm type.
24While not discussed explicitly in his paper, Akerman (2010) models the price of exports by intermediaries as
a double mark-up over tariﬀ-adjusted marginal cost. Increases in the demand elasticity reduce the mark-ups and
narrow the diﬀerence between the export prices of intermediaries and those of direct exporters and increase the share
of exports by intermediaries.












































































































































Wholesale Export Share & (all product-country) tariffs
b=0.0003 (2.959e-05)
Figure 7: Wholesale export share and Product/Country-Product characteristics, 2003. Figures
display the relationship between wholesale export share and the following characteristics: (Top
Left) Relation Speciﬁcity; (Top Right) Coeﬃcient of Variation of the unit values for each product;
(Bottom Right) min(entry, exit) in the export market for a given product; (Bottom Left) Country-
Product export tariﬀs. Observations are placed in 20 equally-sized bins. Coordinates of dots display
the average of tariﬀs and intermediary export share of the data in each bin. Each panel reports
the coeﬃcient, b, of a product-level univariate regression for intermediary export share. Robust
standard error is shown in parenthesis.
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ﬁrms. On the contrary, the indirect mode of export would prevail if the traded good does not
require a relation-speciﬁc investment, as for commoditized products. This prediction is in line
with the hypothesis put forward by Peng and Ilinitch (2001) “the higher the commodity content of
the product, the more likely that export intermediaries will be selected by manufacturers”. This
is conﬁrmed by Figure 7 (top left) which shows a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between
intermediary export share and the measure of relation speciﬁcity. Note that, given the very large
number of observations, data are binned in all plots of Figure 7, although the regression coeﬃcients
are based on all the data.
The relation between product price dispersion, as proxied by the coeﬃcient of variation of
export unit values, and intermediary share is negative and signiﬁcant, Figure 7 top right. This is
the expected relationship if lower price dispersion is associated with more homogeneous products
which are more likely to be handled by intermediaries.
The plot at the bottom left of Figure 7 displays the relation between min(entry, exit) rate in
a product and intermediary export share. The negative and signiﬁcant slope suggests that easier
export entry and exit is associated with a lower export share for wholesalers. Products that have
higher sunk costs of entry (low rates of entry/exit) are more likely to be handled by intermediaries.
Finally we consider the incidence of tariﬀs on the presence of intermediaries in product-country
pairs. The bottom right of Figure 7 shows the relation between product-country tariﬀ and in-
termediary export share. There is a small, positive relation between product-country tariﬀs and
intermediary share.
The overall message of these ﬁgures is consistent with the idea that there is a systematic
relationship between the share of exports managed by wholesalers and both country and product
characteristics.
5.2 Selection into diﬀerent modes of export
The previous section has investigated the univariate correlations of country and product charac-
teristics with the intermediary export share. This section and the next explore the relationship
between country and product characteristics and export participation and levels by wholesalers and
manufacturers.
Recent work on the importance of distance and GDP on the level of exports has emphasized
the role of ﬁrm selection, e.g. Helpman et al. (2008). The empirical literature on intermediation
has not considered selection eﬀects. The issue is more diﬃcult than the standard export problem in
that there are potentially diﬀerent selection criteria for intermediary and direct exporters. Ideally,
we would see the characteristics of the producing ﬁrm and the choice of whether or not to export
and by what method. However, the trade data limits us to observing whether or not a product is
exported by wholesalers alone, manufacturers alone or by both methods. We pursue an admittedly
20Intermediaries in International Trade
imperfect solution by ﬁrst examining the relationship between product and country attributes and
the type of exporter and then examining how the value of exports varies between wholesalers and
manufacturers.
The theoretical framework outlined in Section 2 gives some guidance to the selection problem.
Four mutually exclusive situations might arise as ﬁxed costs of exporting increase. If such costs are
zero, or very low, manufacturers will choose to export directly. For higher ﬁxed costs, some ﬁrms
will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export indirectly while some, more productive ﬁrms still export directly.
With suﬃciently high ﬁxed costs, a third outcome is possible where all ﬁrms go through wholesalers.
At the extreme, prohibitive ﬁxed costs will result in no exports in the product-country pair.
We rank the categories in order of increasing diﬃculty in entering the export market (direct
only, both direct and indirect, indirect only) and estimate an ordered probit model to investigate
the eﬀects of country and product variables in determining the probability of being in one of the
three states,
Categorypc = c + β1Cc + β2Pp + β3τpc + εpc (6)
where Categorypc accounts for the possible three outcomes described above, Cc and Pp are country
and product variables, and τpc is tariﬀ to a particular country-product destination. Results are
reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 8. While most of the coeﬃcients have the predicted sign and
are signiﬁcant, the proportional odds approach is easily rejected as indicated by the χ2 test.
Given the rejection of the ordering of outcomes, columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 report the results
for a multinomial logit speciﬁcation, where the baseline category is exports by manufacturers only.
Country GDP is positively associated with both type of ﬁrms serving the market but is negatively
associated with the likelihood of the market being served by wholesalers alone. Geographical
distance lowers the probability of both groups exporting relative to only manufacturing; comparing
only wholesalers to only manufacturing we ﬁnd the same negative sign with a lower magnitude.
The measures of ﬁxed costs of exports, Market Costs and Governance, behave as predicted by
the theory. Market Costs show the expected positive sign; higher market costs increase the probabil-
ity of both categories of ﬁrms exporting with respect to the baseline category, only manufacturing,
and also increase the probability that wholesalers are the only exporters in the product-country
pair. Better country governance reduces the likelihood that the market will be served by both
wholesalers and manufacturers. Similarly, the Governance measure is negatively associated with
only wholesaling.
Looking at the product characteristics, we ﬁnd the expected sign on the min(entry, exit) proxy
for product-level sunk costs. Lower sunk costs reduce the probability of both categories exporting
relative to the baseline category and the same relation holds also for wholesalers versus manufac-
turers only. The eﬀects of product price dispersion and relation speciﬁcity are less clear and depend
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on the groups being compared.
5.3 Product-country exports
This section investigates the eﬀects of country and product characteristics on the level of exports
of manufacturers and wholesalers for product-country pairs. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 9 report
regression results with the log of country-product exports by exporter type, lnXi
cp, as dependent
variable and country and product characteristics, Cc and Pp, as explanatory variables, together
with a full set of interactions with the wholesaler dummy, DW,
lnXi
cp = c + δDW + β1Cc + γ1Cc ∗ DW + β2Pp + γ2Pp ∗ DW + β3τpc + γ3τpc ∗ DW + dj + εcp. (7)
Columns 1 and 2 add country and product ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively, while column 3 includes all
the available product and country characteristics.25
Results on the country characteristics in columns 1 and 3 suggest that the level of exports of
both manufacturers and wholesalers exports is positively correlated with GDP, however the eﬀects
are signiﬁcantly lower for wholesalers. In contrast to Ahn et al. (2011), geographical distance aﬀects
negatively the value of trade equally for both types of ﬁrms.26
The results on Market Costs and Governance are in line with the theoretical predictions. Inter-
mediaries’ exports increase with market costs, suggesting that wholesalers are better able to spread
ﬁxed costs across products. The country governance indicator yields a similar pattern of results:
better governance is associated with higher exports from manufacturers but that eﬀect is greatly
reduced or disappears entirely for wholesalers.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 9 report the results on the product characteristics. We focus on
the sign and signiﬁcance of the interaction terms with the wholesaler dummy. Wholesalers export
relatively less in products with lower sunk entry costs, i.e. greater min(entry, exit), higher price
dispersion, and higher relationship speciﬁcity. All these coeﬃcients have the expected signs and
point to product characteristics playing an important part in the endogenous choice of ﬁrms to
export directly or through an intermediary.
Finally, we include tariﬀs in column 3. As expected, the coeﬃcient of tariﬀs exhibits a negative
sign; ﬁrms export less in country-product pairs with higher tariﬀs. The wholesaler interaction is
positive but not signiﬁcant.
This section has examined the role of country and product characteristics in the choice of
the mode of export and the magnitude of country-product exports. Results conﬁrm the ﬁndings
of previous studies that country-speciﬁc ﬁxed export costs are correlated with the use of export
25In Column 3 we cluster both on countries and products using cluster2 packages for Stata (Petersen; 2009).
26The speciﬁcation of Ahn et al. (2011) is slightly diﬀerent as they include a smaller set of covariates and do not
include the interacted wholesale dummy.
22Intermediaries in International Trade
intermediaries. We further show that the quality of the more general contracting environment is
related to the choice of mode of export. Exports through an intermediary are more likely when the
quality of the general contracting environment of the country is weak.
We also show that the characteristics of the product play a role in determining the choice of
export mode. Lower contract intensity, greater product homogeneity, and higher product-level sunk
costs of exporting are associated with a greater reliance on intermediaries in exporting.
6 Intermediaries and exogenous shocks
We have documented the variation in the share of indirect exports across countries and products.
The results support the idea that export intermediaries arise in large part because of the presence
of signiﬁcant ﬁxed export costs at the country and product level. In addition, product adding and
product dropping in the export market are greater for wholesale exporters than for manufacturers.
Taken together this evidence suggests that a common shock to proﬁts across destinations, e.g.
a common tariﬀ cut, may have diﬀerent eﬀects both across types of exporting ﬁrms and in the
aggregate across countries due to variation in the composition of exporters.
This section examines whether intermediaries and manufacturers respond diﬀerently to exoge-
nous currency shocks. Using annual ﬂuctuations in bilateral real exchange rates as measures of
exogenous changes in export proﬁtability, we investigate the eﬀects on ﬁrms’ export behavior. We
consider the impact of exchange rate changes on ﬁrm exports to country c, as well as on the number
of exported products and the average value of exports to that destination. Following Bernard et al.
(2007) a ﬁrm’s total exports to a destination can be decomposed into extensive and intensive
margins,
lnXfc = lnProdfc + lnavgXfc (8)
where lnXfc is the log of total exports by ﬁrm f to country c, Prodfc is the number of distinct
HS6 products exported by ﬁrm f to country c, and avgXfc is the average exports per exporting
ﬁrm f to country c. We regress the annual log change from 2000 to 2007 of ﬁrm total exports to
country c and the annual changes of the two components on a dummy for wholesaler (DW
ft), the
change in the log of the real bilateral exchange rate of the Italian currency (∆lnRERct) and their
interaction
∆lnXfct = c1 + δ1DW
ft + β1∆lnRERct + γ1∆lnRERct ∗ DW
ft + dj + ε1
fct (9)
∆lnProdfct = c2 + δ2DW
ft + β2∆lnRERct + γ2∆lnRERct ∗ DW
ft + dj + ε2
fct (10)
∆lnavgXfct = c3 + δ3DW
ft + β3∆lnRERct + γ3∆lnRERct ∗ DW
ft + dj + ε3
fct (11)
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where dj indicates a set of ﬁxed eﬀects. Using data from the International Financial Statistics




where ERct is the nominal Italian exchange rate expressed as the number of foreign currency
units per home currency unit and CPIt
CPIct is the ratio of the domestic consumer price level and
the consumer price index abroad.27 An upward (downward) movement therefore represents an
appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency.
Table 10 reports results from estimating equations 9-11. Since real exchange rate variations
inside the Eurozone are related only to price levels changes and given the relevant role of wholesalers
in Extra-EU destinations, we include in the regressions only countries outside the EU.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 10 present the results for export value, including country and year
ﬁxed eﬀects (column 1) and country and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (column 2). Exchange rate movements
have the expected eﬀects on ﬁrm exports to country c: an appreciation of the euro currency is
associated with a decrease in ﬁrm exports. However, the interaction of wholesaler type and the real
exchange rate is positive and signiﬁcant in both columns; ﬁrm exports fall less (3.7-8.4 percent) for
intermediaries than for manufacturers when the Italian currency appreciates.
Looking at columns 3-6 we observe that, for both manufacturing and wholesale ﬁrms, the fall in
exports in response to an appreciation of the domestic currency is driven both by a decrease in the
number of products exported and by a decline in the ﬁrm’s average exports per country. However,
for wholesalers, the adjustment on the extensive margin of the number of products is greater,
while the response of average exports is more muted. These results would appear to conﬁrm that
wholesale exporters face lower ﬁxed costs and are thus able to adjust more easily along the extensive
margin than direct exporters.
We next explore the sensitivity of the ﬁrm’s response within a country-product pair to annual
exchange rate movements by considering export value, quality and unit value. The estimation
equation is
∆lnYfpct = c1 + δDW
ft + β1∆lnRERct + γ∆lnRERct ∗ DW
ft + dj + εfpct (12)
where lnYfpct is the log of ﬁrm-level product-country export value, quantity or unit value. Columns
1, 3 and 5 of Table 11 report results with country, product and year ﬁxed eﬀects, while in columns
2, 4 and 6 replace product dummies with ﬁrm-product ﬁxed eﬀects. As before, exports fall as
the Italian currency appreciates but the eﬀect for wholesalers is 15-30 percent smaller. For direct
exporters the adjustment to a stronger home currency is primarily due to reductions in export
27Details on the exchange rate variables are available in the Appendix.
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quantities (90 percent) rather than in unit value (10 percent). For wholesalers, the overall adjust-
ment is smaller due to a much smaller quantity response. Wholesalers drop their unit values more
as the currency rises, pass-through is lower, and quantities fall less.
The literature on intermediaries in trade largely has focused on the underlying choice of ﬁrms
to export directly or indirectly and in particular on the role of ﬁxed export costs. This section has
shown that these choices give rise to diﬀerent responses to common external shocks to proﬁtability.
Wholesalers are less responsive to exchange rate changes precisely because they are better able to
adjust along the extensive margin.
6.1 Aggregate Exports
The ﬁrm-level results presented above suggest that the endogenous choice of direct or indirect
exporting by producing ﬁrms should matter for the response of aggregate, country-level export
volumes to exogenous shocks such as changes in the exchange rate. Destinations with high wholesale
export shares should show smaller responses of exports in response to exchange rate changes than
countries with low wholesale export shares.
In Table 12 we consider a simple speciﬁcation of the form
∆lnYct = c1 + δDW
c + β1∆lnRERct + γ∆lnRERct ∗ DW
c + dj + εct (13)
where lnYct is the log of country exports and DW
c is a dummy that equals one if the country-level
share of wholesale exports is greater than the median (mean), and the exchange rate is deﬁned as
before. Columns 1 and 3 report results with year ﬁxed eﬀects, while columns 2 and 4 include both
year and country ﬁxed eﬀects.
In every case, the results strongly conﬁrm the importance of the mode of export in shaping the
aggregate responses to changes in the real exchange rate. The exchange rate export elasticity for
countries with low wholesale shares is negative and signiﬁcant, ranging from -0.232 to -0.499 across
the speciﬁcations. In contrast, countries with wholesale export shares above the mean or median
have elasticities that are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
7 Conclusions
The present paper examines the role of intermediaries in exporting, the factors that lead ﬁrms to
export indirectly, and the consequences of intermediary exporters on trade value and the margins
of adjustment to external shocks. Using Italian ﬁrm-level trade data, we investigate the impor-
tance of wholesalers in exports across destinations and products and examine how they diﬀer from
manufacturing ﬁrms that export directly. Intermediary exporters are smaller, ship more products
and reach fewer countries than direct exporters.
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We conﬁrm the ﬁndings of previous research that wholesalers are more likely to export to
countries with high ﬁxed export costs and to smaller markets. However, exporting by wholesalers
is also more common in destinations with weak contracting environments and in products that
are more homogeneous, have higher sunk entry costs and have lower relationship speciﬁcity. The
ability of intermediaries to eﬀectively lower destination and product ﬁxed costs means that they
are to churn their product mix more often and adjust along the extensive margin.
The diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs across destinations and products have important implications
for ﬁrm-level and aggregate responses to exogenous changes in proﬁtability such as exchange rates.
Wholesalers are more likely to adjust their product mix in response to an exchange rate change and
their total exports adjust less. Given the big diﬀerence in the share of intermediated exports across
countries and products, these ﬁrm-level results suggest that there are potentially large diﬀerences
in how aggregate exports will respond to changes in the value of the domestic currency that are
linked to the type of the exporting ﬁrm. We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly lower responses of aggregate exports
to changes in the exchange rate for destinations served primarily by wholesale exporters.
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Table 1: Exports and Number of exporting ﬁrms: share by type of ﬁrms, 2000-2007
Year Total Exports Manuf Whol Retail Others
(billion) Share (%)
2000 246.79 85.09 9.85 0.74 4.32
2001 258.99 86.49 9.88 0.86 2.76
2002 260.75 84.75 10.93 0.83 3.49
2003 254.91 85.52 10.71 0.86 2.91
2004 274.38 85.65 10.5 0.82 3.91
2005 286.56 85.5 10.75 0.85 4.91
2006 319.01 84.95 11.32 0.85 5.91
2007 350.57 85 11.27 0.84 6.91
Year Exporters Manuf Whol Retail Others
(N. of ﬁrms) Share (%)
2000 137347 57.3 26.43 7.67 8.6
2001 141520 56.46 27.01 7.95 8.58
2002 145473 55.64 27.06 8.14 9.16
2003 143421 55.57 27.41 7.72 9.3
2004 139598 55.34 27.61 7.46 10.3
2005 133473 54.96 27.48 7.3 11.3
2006 139360 53.7 28.07 7.31 12.3
2007 128472 54.77 27.91 6.88 13.3
Note: Table reports the share of exports and the share of exporters by type of ﬁrms (Manufacturers, Wholesalers,
Retailers and Others).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Wholesale export share at Country, Product and Country-product
level, 2003
Obs Zeros Ones Mean Median
All sample 228 8 0 .166 .133
Country Intra-EU 14 0 0 .118 .109
Extra-EU 214 8 0 .170 .137
All Sample 5125 226 95 .211 .098
Product Intra-EU 5009 579 156 .204 .056
Extra-EU 5011 332 129 .220 .116
All Sample 244614 118891 25506 .208 .001
Country-Prod Intra-EU 51274 17717 3559 .187 .014
Extra-EU 193340 101174 21907 .213 0
Table 3: Export premia, 2003
ln Salesf ln Employmentf ln Sales/Empl.f ln Exportsf ln Exports/Empl.f
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DW
f -0.111*** -0.533*** 0.433*** -1.047*** -0.025
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016) (0.015)
DX




f -0.081*** -0.489*** 0.388***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
R-squared 0.22 0.29 0.14 0.03 0.001
Observations 985719 1022424 985710 118994 118994
Notes: Table reports OLS regression of noted characteristic on dummy for wholesaler (D
W
f ), dummy for exporter
(D
X




f ). Robust standard errors are reported below coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote
signiﬁcance levels (***: p <1%; **: p<% 5%; *: p<10%). Data are for 2003.
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Table 4: Export premia: Number of Countries and Number of Products, 2003
Productsf Productsf Productsf Countriesf Countriesf Countriesf
DW
f -1.269*** 3.005*** 1.668*** -4.562*** -0.158*** -1.630***
(0.093) (0.118) (0.088) (0.058) (0.053) (0.043)
ln Employmentf 4.180*** 4.307***
(0.070) (0.036)
ln Exportsf 2.805*** 2.801***
(0.027) (0.015)
R-squared 0.001 0.13 0.25 0.03 0.27 0.45
Observations 118994 118994 118994 118994 118994 118994
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates of the number of HS6 products exported (Productsf) and the number of desti-
nation countries (Countriesf) on a dummy for wholesaler (D
W
f ). The regression sample is exporting ﬁrms. Robust
standard errors are reported below coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p< 1%;**: p<5%; *: p<%
10%). Data are for 2003.
Table 5: Firm’s exports, quantity and unit value by product and country by diﬀerent type of ﬁrms,
2003 - Extra-EU
ln Exportsfcp ln Exportsfcp ln Quantityfcp ln Quantityfcp ln UnitValuefcp ln UnitValuefcp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D
W
f -0.307*** -0.113*** -0.314*** -0.115*** 0.007 0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
ln Salesf 0.196*** 0.201*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Adj R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.42 0.44 0.63 0.63
Observations 1190313 1190313 1190313 1190313 1190313 1190313
Countries 184 184 184 184 184 184
HS6 Products 4042 4042 4042 4042 4042 4042
Firms 105649 105649 105649 105649 105649 105649
Note: Table reports results of regressions at the ﬁrm product country level, using data on exports, quantity and unit
value for 2003 and Extra-EU destinations only. D
W
f is a dummy for wholesaler; Sales is ﬁrm’s total sales. Only
product-country pair in which both wholesalers and manufacturers are both active are included. Robust standard
errors clustered at ﬁrm level are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels
(***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
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Table 6: Product dropping each year (2000&2003) by diﬀerent type of ﬁrms, Extra-EU.
Dropfpt Dropfpt Dropfpt Dropfpt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DW
ft 0.069*** 0.043*** 0.017*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)






Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm-Product Firm-Product Firm-Product Firm-Product
Adj R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.19
Observations 1221737 1221737 1221737 1221737
HS6 Products 5259 5259 5259 5259
Firms 110452 110452 110452 110452
Note: Table reports OLS regression results of a dummy variable indicating a ﬁrm-product drop between t and t + 1.
D
W
ft is a dummy for wholesaler; Salesft is ﬁrm’s total sales; Deviationfpt is (log of) ﬁrm’s exports in product p minus
(log of) average exports in product p; and Productsft is the number of products exported by each ﬁrm. All variables
are computed at time t. The regression sample is surviving exporting ﬁrms. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted for clustering by ﬁrm-product. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
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Table 7: Adding regression (2000&2003) by diﬀerent type of ﬁrms, Extra-EU
All ﬁrms SPF MPF All ﬁrms SPF MPF All ﬁrms MPF
Addft Addft Addft Addft Addft Addft Addft Addft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D
W
ft 0.026*** 0.072*** 0.010** 0.031*** 0.071*** 0.017*** 0.036*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
ln Salesft 0.023*** 0.009*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln Productsft 0.057*** 0.085***
(0.006) (0.005)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Mix FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Industry-Mix Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.006 0.110 0.002 0.013 0.111 0.003 0.021 0.003
Observations 167081 31175 135906 167081 31175 135906 167081 135906
Firms 110452 28304 90041 110452 28304 90041 110452 90041
Industry-mix 32383 88 32382 32383 88 32382 32383 32382
Note: Table reports OLS regression results of a dummy variable indicating a ﬁrm adding a product between t and
t+1. D
W
ft is a dummy for wholesaler; Salesft is ﬁrm’s total sales; and Productsft is the number of products exported
by each ﬁrm. SPF and MPF are, respectively, single and multi product ﬁrms. All variables are computed at time t.
The regression sample is surviving exporting ﬁrms. Industry-mix FE allows to control for ﬁrms with the same mix
of industries at the HS2 level. Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering by industry-mix.
Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
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Table 8: Logistic Regression, 2003 - Extra-EU
Ordered Probit Multinomial Logit
Category (1) Category (1)
vs vs
Category (2) Category (3)
ln GDPc 0.061*** 0.162*** -0.169***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
ln Distancec -0.332*** -0.474*** -0.152***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Market Costsc 0.147*** 0.069*** 0.212***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019)
Governance Indicatorc -0.032*** -0.100*** -0.250***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017)
Tariﬀcp 0.047** 0.027 0.093***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.031)
min(entry,exit)p -0.465*** -0.420*** -0.652***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.070)
Coeﬃcient of Variationp 0.04*** 0.077*** -0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Relation Speciﬁcityp 0.349*** 0.876*** -0.649***
(0.045) (0.051) (0.074)
Observations 134322 134322
Observations Category 1 65775 65775
Observations Category 2 58556 58556
Observations Category 3 9991 9991
Test for prop. odd model
(Prob > χ
2 ) 0.000
Note: Table reports ordered probit and multinomial logit regression of diﬀerent categories of product-country combinations.
Category (1) product-country in which only manufacture exports; Category (2) product-country in which both manufacture
and wholesale export; Category (3) product-country in which only wholesale exports. Categories (1), (2) and (3) contains
respectively, 4957, 4467 and 4624 products. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote
signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Data are for 2003. Results of the ordered probit suggests that the
proportional odds approach is not appropriate since the χ2 test is statistically signiﬁcant.
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DW 3.208*** -0.869*** 4.432***
(0.847) (0.141) (0.900)
































Country FE No Yes No
Product FE Yes No No
Clustering Country HS6 Product Country-Product
Adj R-squared 0.44 0.25 0.24
Observations 117112 117112 117112
Countries 142 142 142
HS6 Products 3623 3623 3623
Note: Table reports OLS regression of logarithm of aggregate exports by type for Extra-EU. DW is a dummy for wholesale
and ∗DW is the interacted dummy. Robust standard errors clustered at diﬀerent levels are reported in parenthesis below the
coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Data are for 2003.
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Table 10: Exchange rates and ﬁrm-country exports (1 and 2), number of products (3 and 4), average
exports (5 and 6) over time, by diﬀerent type of ﬁrms, Extra-EU
Annual Diﬀerences
ln Xfct ln Xfct ln Prodfct ln Prodfct ln Avg Xfct ln Avg Xfct
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D
W
ft -0.015*** -0.001 -0.014***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
ln Real Ex Ratect -0.519*** -0.461*** -0.186*** -0.086** -0.333*** -0.375***
(0.150) (0.121) (0.047) (0.037) (0.107) (0.089)
∗D
W
ft 0.042* 0.017* -0.046** -0.046* 0.087** 0.064*
(0.026) (0.011) (0.023) (0.028) (0.039) (0.038)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clustering Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year
Adj R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001
Observations 2483679 2483679 2483679 2483679 2483679 2483679
Countries 149 149 149 149 149 149
Firms 137262 137262 137262 137262 137262 137262
Note: Table reports results of regressions at the ﬁrm country level, using data on exports, number of products and
average exports between 2000 and 2007. The dependent and independent variables are deﬁned as annual diﬀerences.
D
W
ft is a dummy for wholesaler and ∗D
W
ft is the interacted dummy. Robust standard errors clustered at country-year
level are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%;
*: p<10%).
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Table 11: Exchange rates and ﬁrm’s exports, quantity and unit value by product and country over
time, by diﬀerent type of ﬁrms, Extra-EU
Annual Diﬀerences
ln Xfcpt ln Xfcpt ln Quantityfcpt ln Quantityfcpt ln UnitValuefcpt ln UnitValuefcpt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DW
ft -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.002***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
ln Real Ex Ratect -0.321*** -0.385*** -0.287*** -0.353*** -0.035*** -0.032***
(0.095) (0.113) (0.100) (0.117) (0.011) (0.011)
∗DW
ft 0.072* 0.065* 0.092** 0.090** -0.020* -0.025*
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.012) (0.014)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes No Yes No Yes NO
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clustering Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year Country-Year
Adj R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001
Observations 4008339 4008339 4008339 4008339 4008339 4008339
Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150
Firms 119201 119201 119201 119201 119201 119201
HS6 Products 5201 5201 5201 5201 5201 5201
Note: Table reports results of regressions at the ﬁrm product country level, using data on exports, quantity and unit
value between 2000 and 2007. The dependent and independent variables are deﬁned as annual diﬀerences. D
W
ft is
a dummy for wholesaler and ∗D
W
ft is the interacted dummy. Robust standard errors clustered at country-year level
are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *:
p<10%).
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Table 12: Exchange rates and country exports, Extra-EU
Annual Diﬀerences
ln Xct ln Xct ln Xct ln Xct
(Above) Median Median Mean Mean





ln Real Exchange Ratect -0.269** -0.499*** -0.232** -0.460***
(0.145) (0.162) (0.115) (0.145)
∗D
W
c 0.253* 0.511*** 0.224** 0.497***
(0.150) (0.164) (0.117) (0.147)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1489 1489 1489 1489
Adj R-squared 0.021 -0.057 0.020 -0.06
R-squared 0.028 0.062 0.028 0.063
Countries 160 160 160 160
Note: Table reports results of regressions at the country-year level, using data on exports between 2000 and 2010.
The dependent and independent variables are deﬁned as annual diﬀerences. D
W
c is a dummy that takes value 1 if
the intermediary export share to country c is above the median (mean) value of intermediary export share across
countries ∗D
W
c is the interacted dummy. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients.
Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p< 10%).
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Appendix
Firm trade data
ISTAT collects data on export transactions, which are the basic unit of observation for trade ﬂows.
It is then possible to link transactions to ﬁrms using the value added tax identiﬁcation code (partita
IVA) of the ﬁrm which is also recorded in the transaction.28 There are diﬀerent requirements in
order for a transaction to be recorded. These requirements depend on the destination, Intra or
Extra-EU, and on the value of the transactions. The European Union sets a common framework
but leaves some ﬂexibility to member states.
As far as Extra-EU transactions are concerned there is a good deal of homogeneity among
member states as well as over time. Since the adoption of the euro as a common currency, Italy set
the threshold at 620 euro (or 1,000 Kg), so that all transactions bigger than 620 euro (or 1,000 Kg)
are recorded. All these records of Extra-EU transactions report complete information, that is, also
information about the product. From 2007 onward the threshold is at 1,000 euro (or 1,000 Kg).
Most of the existing diﬀerences are due to varying Intra-EU requirements. In 2003 there were
two reporting thresholds: 200,000 euros29 and 40,000 euros. Firms with more than 200,000 euros
of exports (based on the previous year) have to ﬁll in the Intrastat document monthly. They report
complete information including details about products. Firms with exports between 40,000 and
200,000 euros have to ﬁll in the Intrastat form on a quarterly basis. The value of exports is recorded
but not information on products. Below 40,000 euros per year the transactions are not recorded.
Country and product data
In Section 3.2 we complement the ﬁrm-level trade data with country characteristics including proxies
for market size and variable and ﬁxed trade costs.
To proxy transportation costs we use data on geographic distance taken from CEPII. Distances
are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most
important city (in terms of population) or of the oﬃcial capital, if diﬀerent.
As a proxy for policy barriers we use a measure of country-level import tariﬀs. Tariﬀ data are
taken from World Integrated Trade System (WITS), a project jointly developed by the World Bank
and UNCTAD. WITS contains the TRAINS database on bilateral tariﬀs at the six-digit level of
the Harmonized System (HS) product classiﬁcation for about 5,000 products and 200 countries.
To generate a proxy for the market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting to a country, we use in-
formation from the World Bank Doing Business database (DB). The World Bank compiles pro-
cedural requirements for importing a standardized container of goods by ocean transport. All
28The value-added tax identiﬁcation number also allows the linking of export data to various Censuses conducted
by ISTAT.
29In 2007 this threshold was raised to 250,000.
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documents needed by the exporters and importers in each country to trade goods across the border
are recorded, along with the time and cost necessary for completing the transaction (for details,
see Djankov et al.; 2011). For the purpose of the analysis three variables are used: number of
documents for importing includes all documents required per shipment to import the goods from a
given destination; cost of importing measures the fees levied on a 20-foot container in US dollars;
time to import reﬂects the number of days needed to import a standard container of goods from a
factory in the largest business city to a ship in the most accessible port. Data are available from
2004 to 2010. Given the low variability of these indicators, we take the average value over the
available years.
To compute the real exchange rate used in Section 6 we use data from the International Financial
Statistics dataset (IMF, 2010). The oﬃcial exchange rate available at IMF refers to the exchange
rate determined by national authorities or to the rate determined in the legally sanctioned exchange
market. It is calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages. Consumer price index
reﬂects changes in the cost of a basket of goods and services that may be ﬁxed or changed at
speciﬁed intervals. The Laspeyres formula is generally used to compute such price index.
In addition to country characteristics, product and industry characteristics are also taken into
account. The ﬁrst variable that we consider is a measure of industry contract intensity developed by
Nunn (2007) to measure the importance of relationship-speciﬁc investment in intermediate inputs
across industries. Nunn’s data are classiﬁed according to the industry classiﬁcation of the US I-
O table compiled by the Bureau of Economic Activity. To match each I-O industry to an HS6
product, ﬁrst we use information from Lawson et al. (2002) to construct a concordance between
I-O industry classiﬁcation and NAICS1997 code. Then the data are converted from NAICS1997
to NAICS2002. Finally, we exploit the concordance between Harmonize System Codes and NAICS
Industries developed by Pierce and Schott (2009) to obtain the information on contract intensity
at the level of HS6 product.
Principal Components
Tables A1 and A2 report the principal component analysis (PCA) on standardized variables for
Market Costs and Governance, respectively.
Because principal component is intended to study correlation patterns, it is ﬁrst necessary to
standardize the variables of interest so that they all have the same variance. Without standardizing,
indeed, the principal component method would favor the variables with larger variances at the
expenses of those with smaller values.
The panel in the middle of Tables A1 and A2 shows the total variance accounted by each
factor. The Kaiser criterion suggests to retain those factors with variance equal or higher than
1. In both cases there is only one factor that satisﬁes this criterion and this factor explain the
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77 percent and the 86 percent of the sum of all observed variances. The lower panel of the two
tables reports the factor loadings which are the parameters of the linear function that relates the
observed variables and the factor. The higher the load the more relevant the variable in deﬁning
the factor’s dimensionality. According to Table A1, the loadings on Factor1 are relatively large for
all the variables. The same holds when looking at Table A2. Finally, uniqueness is the variance
that is “unique” to the variable and not shared with others. Again all variables, in both tables,
have a low percentage of variance not accounted by other variables.
Table A1: PCA for Market Costs
Number of Obs. 180
Retained Factors 1





Standardized Variables Factor1 Loadings Uniqueness
Number of documents for importing 0.81 0.34
Cost of importing 0.87 0.23
Time to import 0.93 0.12
Table A2: PCA for Governance Indicator
Number of Obs. 193
Retained Factors 1








Standardized Variables Factor1 Loadings Uniqueness
Voice & Accountability 0.86 0.25
Political Stability 0.85 0.27
Government Eﬀectiveness 0.96 0.09
Regulatory Quality 0.95 0.1
Rule of low 0.98 0.05
Control of Corruption 0.96 0.09
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